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NOTES
ELIMINATION OF THE NBA's "ONE AND DONE"
RULE WILL OPEN DOORS FOR POTENTIAL

INCOMING ROOKIES
INTRODUCTION

The general population has it impressed upon them that being an athlete comes hand-in-hand with an exorbitant amount of employment opportunities and even stardom. However, an athlete's employment opportunities are not as easy or as glorious as most people believe. The policies
implemented by the National Basketball Association (hereinafter "NBA")
have created an environment which results in limited opportunities for potential incoming rookies. The NBA implemented the notorious "one and
done" policy in 2005, for the purpose of protecting its rookies, but, in turn,
the "one and done" policy is actually doing more harm than good.1
The sports industry - and, more specifically, its athletes - is governed
by numerous legal authorities, which place constraints on the entirety of
the process. These authorities consist of: (1) the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
(hereinafter "Sherman Act"); (2) the league's Collective Bargaining
Agreement (hereinafter "CBA"); (3) the National Collegiate Athletic Association (hereinafter "NCAA"); and (4) case law on the amateur status
of student-athletes.2
Student-athletes have been subject to a loss of opportunity due to
Sherman, the CBA, and the NCAA because they cannot transform from

1. Tim Bontemps, The one-and-done rule is on the way out - because of NBA money, not
NCAA morals, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/theone-and-done-nile-is-on-the-way-out-because-of-nba-money-not-ncaa-morals/2018/04/25
/95f68868-48a0-1 1e8-827e-190efaflflee-story.html?utmterm=.a7fa0fc2el46.
2. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015); Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285 (7th
Cir. 2016); The AntitrustLaws, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 11, 2020); Collective Bargaining
Agreement, Bus. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/collective-bargainingagreement.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
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collegiate athletes to professional athletes. The CBA for the NBA, which
is still in place today, is the document responsible for setting forth the
"one and done" rule.3 The "one and done" rule states, in sum, that a player
must be at least nineteen years old during the year of the draft when the
player declares, or they must be at least one year removed from high
school.4 The "one and done" rule, along with the holdings of two seminal
federal cases, O 'Bannon v. National CollegiateAthletic Association5 and
Berger v. National CollegiateAthletic Association,6 both of which upheld
the NCAA's rule that student-athletes are amateurs and thus should not be
paid, have essentially taken the employment opportunities that eighteenyear-old athletes would be able to receive if they qualify for the NBA. 7
The players' choice to either go to college right out of high school or play
professional basketball is still being hindered by these rules. While the
NCAA has recently passed guidelines that would potentially allow student-athletes to be paid for their name, image, and likeness, the proposed
changes would not be enacted for a few years.8 Therefore, for the majority
of collegiate athletes, there is no longer any incentive to remain within
their college program for more than one year at this time.9
This note will address the current issue that the "one and done" rule
has presented to the underrepresented class of student-athletes who have
hopes to play in the NBA.10 An examination of the history of the NBA,
how the "one and done" rule came to be, and the current law governing
student-athletes, will demonstrate that the "one and done" rule should be
3.

See generally 2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

273
(2017),
https://cosmic-s3.imgix.net/3c7aa5O-8el 1-1 1e9-875d-3d44e94ae33f-2017-NBANBPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf (explaining player eligibility).
4. Id.
5. See generally 0 'Bannon,802 F.3d at 1079 (holding that "the NCAA's rules have been more
restrictive than necessary to maintain its tradition of amateurism").
6. See generally Berger, 843 F.3d at 293 (holding that the appellants were unable to "allege
that the activities they pursued as student athletes qualify as 'work' sufficient to trigger the minimum
wage requirements of the FLSA").
7. See infra Sections VI, VII.
8. Stacey Osburn, Board of Governors starts process to enhance name, image and likeness
opportunities, NCAA (Oct. 29, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news
(outlining pro/board-governors-starts-process-enhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities
posed guidelines that asks the three divisions to submit policies that would allow student-athletes to
be paid for their name, image, and likeness. The proposed rules stress that, inter alia, student-athletes
should not be considered employees of the organization or be treated differently than non-studentathletes).
9. See id. (noting that each division should have new rules in place by January 2021).
10. See generally Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016) (discussing the rights of student athletes to receive compensation, and whether the students can be considered employees under
the FLSA). Student athletes can be considered an underrepresented class because they are considered
amateurs, and not employees of the schools they play for. Id. at 291.
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removed from the NBA's CBA. The rule designed to protect incoming
rookies has proven faulty and has caused greater harm to parties than it
has protected.11 This note proposes that the NBA adopt the mechanism
of player drafting that the MILB has implemented because it benefits the
majority of the parties involved.12
I.

STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION

The NBA began in 1946 as the "Basketball Association of America,"
before merging with the "National Basketball League" in 1949.13 After
having some initial drawbacks, fighting financial challenges, and then
competing with another rival league known as the "American Basketball
Association" (hereinafter "ABA"), which merged with the NBA in 1976,
the NBA finally began to gain major traction in the 1980s. 1 4 Its tremendous growth was mainly due to competitive rivalries between players,
such as Larry Bird and Magic Johnson.15 The NBA has only grown in
popularity since players like Michael Jordan, Kobe Bryant, and LeBron
James have broken through into mainstream popularity (and also because
of the efforts of former commissioner David Stem). 6 The popularity of
these players was not limited to being known only as mere basketball
players; through their commercial endorsements and media presence, they
became modem day icons.17
Currently, the NBA is comprised of thirty teams and split into two
conferences, the Eastern conference and Western conference. 18 Twentynine of those teams exist in the United States and the remaining one is in

11. See Bontemps, supra note 1 (stating that with this new rule, scouts stopped recruiting players from high school, costing them a potentially lucrative contracts with the NBA).
12. See generally First-YearPlayer Draft, Official Rules, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, http://
mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rles.jsp (last visited Mar. 11, 2020) (explaining the MLB draft rules).
13. NBA HISTORY, https://nbahoopsonline.com/History/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Glenn Rifkin, How the NationalBasketball Association Put the Bounce Back in Basketball,
3
(last visited Mar.
STRATEGY + Bus., https://www.strategy-business.com/article/17785?gko=669b
11, 2020); see also NBA FrequentlyAsked Questions, NBA, http://www.nba.com/news/faq (last visited Mar. 11, 2020) (listing some of the best and most popular players to have played in the NBA).
17. The NBA has grown so much in popularity that players' playing styles, celebrations, and
even fashion senses are being mimicked by people all around the world. E.g., Rifkin, supra note 16
("A small but growing number [of players] have attained the level of celebrity status usually reserved
for movie and rock stars.").
18. Daniel Brown, How the NBA is Structured, THE NBA (Oct. 22, 2015), http://
stb873.edu.csesalford.com.
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Canada.19 The two conferences each have fifteen teams.2 ° Each conference has three divisions, with five teams making up each division.2 1
The following discusses general background information as a primer
on the schedule of the average NBA season. An average NBA season is
made up of eighty-two regular season games, three rounds of playoffs,
and then the finals in the post-season.2 2 The first eight teams in each conference with the best record will qualify for the first round of the
playoffs.23 The first seeded team plays the eighth seed, the second seeded
team plays the seventh seed, the third seeded team plays the sixth seed,
and then the fourth and fifth seeds play each other.2 4 The victors of both
conferences will then play in the NBA finals, and the winner of this round
becomes the champion of the season.
There are two types of structures that a sports league can maintain: a
traditional league and a single entity league. 26 A traditional league, unlike
a single entity league, is structured so "the teams had a 'discrete legal entity' because they are separately owned and operated with non-shared expenses, revenues, profits, losses, and capital expenditures."27 Along with
many other professional sports leagues in the United States, the NBA
maintains a traditional structure.28 In a single entity league, even though
there are different teams, all the teams are owned by the league, and therefore the league acts as a parent company.2 9 Therefore, no team has true
autonomy. In a traditional league, because the individual teams have independent control of capital expenditures, a traditional league permits for
an increase in competition amongst teams to bid for the best players and,
in turn, attempt to compete for the championship. 3° By being a traditional
19.

Brown, supra note 18.

20.

Id.

21. Id.
22. Besfort Ahmeti, How many times does one team in the NBA play anotherin a regularseason?, QUORA (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.quora.com/How-many-times-does-one-team-in-the-NBAplay-another-in-a-regular-season.
23. NBA FrequentlyAsked Questions, supra note 16.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Lacie L. Kaiser, The Flightfrom Single-Entity Structured Sport Leagues, 2 DEPAUL J.
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2004).

27. Id. at 6.
28. Id. at 1, 5 ("[T]raditional professional sport leagues tend to be structured in a similar, 'traditional' way. Leagues are generally unincorporated joint ventures, in which there is a central office
that oversees the individually owned teams.").
29. See id. at 8 (noting "that there is always a 'unity of purpose or a common design' for a
single entity such as a parent company and its subsidiaries") (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep.
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)).
30. Id. at 8.
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league, teams are allowed to "compete in several ways off the field, which
itself tends to show that the teams pursue diverse interests and thus are not
a single enterprise." 3 1 Through the use of a traditional league, teams are
and, through their autonomy,
able to better compete against one another
32
can create for a better consumer product.

THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT AND ITS ROLE IN THE NBA

II.

At first glance, the NBA appears to be a monopoly. A monopoly is
a "market situation where one producer (or a group of producers acting in
concert) controls supply of a good or service, and where the entry of new
producers is prevented or highly restricted. ' 33 The NBA is the biggest
platform in the United States (and the world) that allows players to play
the sport of basketball professionally, and it controls the service that players provide to fans. 34 Due to the "big business" of the NBA, it is naturally
subject to many Sherman regulations and lawsuits.35
The Sherman Act was passed by Congress in 1890, a time where
monopolies ran rampant, and certain "bad" business practices needed to
36
be restricted in order for fair business proceedings to survive. The Sherman Act was Congress' attempt to promote free trade within the United
States.

37

The sections of the Sherman Act that impact professional sports
leagues include section one and section two. Section one of the Sherman
Act (hereinafter "Sherman One") states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not

31.
32.
33.
oly.html
34.
35.

Kaiser, supra note 26, at 8 (quoting Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994)).
See id. (noting that the teams compete with each other in more than one way).
Monopoly, Bus. DICTIONARY, http://www.bisinessdictionary.com/definition/monop(last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
See NBA HISTORY, supra note 13 (detailing the creation and history of the NBA).
Carl W. Hittinger & Adam D. Brown, Antitrust law looms over sports contract analysis,

PITTSBuRGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 14, 2011), https://www.post-gazette.com/business/legal/

/14/Antitrust-law-looms-over-sports-contracts-analysis/stories/
36. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 2.
37. Id.
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exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
38
court.

Section two (hereinafter "Sherman Two") states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding
39
10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Congress' draft of Sherman One technically prohibited every agreement in restraint of trade, which the Supreme Court interpreted to mean
unreasonable restraints of trade.4 ° Congress "wanted to go to the utmost
extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements."'" As a result, the "rule of reason" test was formed.42 The rule of
reason test is "whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable
restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including
specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's history, nature, and effect. 4 3 When a Sherman One violation is at issue, the finder of fact must
analyze the claim under a "rule of reason test."' A Sherman Two violation occurs when at least sixty percent of market share has been taken up
by one specific business entity.45

38.
39.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).

40. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10(1997); see also Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc 'y,
457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982) (citing United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898)).
41. See Kaiser, supra note 26, at 3 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186,

194 (1974)).
42.

State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10 (internal citation omitted).

43.

Id.

44. See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (analyzing a
Sherman One violation claim under the Rule of Reason).
45. Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 651 F.2d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 1981); Thomas
J. Klotz, Monopoly Power: Use, ProofandRelationship to Anticompetitive Effects in Section 2 Cases
1 (Fed. Trade Comm'n, Working Paper 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public
_events/section-2-sherman-act-hearings-single-firm-conduct-related-cmpetitidon/section2mnopolypower.pdf.
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THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT AND ITS ROLE

IN THE NBA

Sports have become such a massive part of the everyday lives of fans
all over the world, and the sports industry receives so much media coverage. 46 Additionally, the business of sports is rather unusual because of the
players' popularity throughout the world.47 As a result of this, there needs
to be some form of a contractual relationship between the employers (the
league/teams) and the players.4 8 Since the media avidly covers sports and
other sport related events, there is a greater attention placed on the players
as compared to other classes of workers who are represented by unions.4 9
It should be noted that, there is a distinction between student-athletes and
professional athletes.50 A CBA only applies to professional organizations
and professional athletes but not student-athletes or the NCAA, which is
the organization governing student-athletes. 51 Therefore, student-athletes
come along with a CBA, includare not entitled to all of the benefits that
52
ing the protection provided by unions.
A CBA is a written contract between a duly certified union and an
employer setting forth the negotiated terms for working conditions within
that industry/job for a certain period of time. 53 In the context of sports, a
46. See Mitchell Kiefer, Sport Offers a Hopeful Escapefrom Everyday Life, SPORTS CONFLICT
INST., https://sportsconflict.org/sport-offers-hopeful-escape-everyday-life/ (last visited Mar. 11,
2020) ("[Sports is described as having] the ability to pull people into a hopeful escape from the real
world. Rather than dealing with the struggles of day-to-day life, people are able to engage in sport in
a way that shuts out everything else.").
47. Id. ("The point is, however, that sport may be a bit different than many other passions in
the way it engulfs participants from the world.").
48. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The nature of professional sports as a
business and professional sports teams as employers calls for contractual arrangements suited to that
unusual commercial context. However, these arrangements result from the same federally mandated
processes as do collective agreements in the more familiar industrial context.").
49. Id. at 959-60.
50. See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2015); Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d
285,292 (7th Cir. 2016) (discussing the rights of student athletes to receive compensation and whether
the students can be considered employees under the FLSA).
. 51. Glenn Wong, A Sports Lawyer Explains What an NCAA Players Union Would Look Like,
BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 28, 2014), https://bleacherreport.corm/articles/2009931-a-sports-lawyer-explains-what-an-ncaa-players-union-would-look-like.
52. Id. ("If unions become recognized at multiple schools, including public and private universities, then each school could choose to negotiate either individually or collectively. If a university
chose to negotiate collectively, then both the student-athletes and the 'employer' schools would need
to select representation for collective bargaining negotiations. The NCAA could act as this representative. However, it is more likely that the representation would consist of a subset of schools that are
unionized."); see O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1049, 1054 (student-athletes are amateurs and not entitled
to compensation); Berger, 843 F.3d at 285, 293.
53. See Collective BargainingAgreement, supra note 2.
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duly certified union is a representative body of individuals that employees
(professional players) have elected to represent their interests.5 4 The union is usually a players union that has been established, and the employer
is the league that those players are a part of 55 This power was granted
under Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, which states,
"[r]epresentatives... selected ...by the majority of the employees in a
unit... shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining."5 6 Additionally, under federal law, once the players union has been formed and a representative has
been elected, the players cannot negotiate with the employer without the
approval of the representative.5 7 A CBA establishes standard conditions
for employment such as wages, hours, and holidays.58 The CBA will also
set forth more specific terms such as team salary caps, free agency requirements, and any dispute resolution procedures.5 9 Matters such as
6
these are imperative in the professional sports bargaining process. 0
61
A CBA is a contract.
First, it allows an employer and a union to agree upon those arrangements that best suit their particular interests. Courts cannot... fashion
contract terms more efficient than those arrived at by the parties who are
to be governed 62by them. Second, freedom of contract furthers the goal
of labor peace.
In terms of professional sports, there are many conclusions and rules
that may be agreed to between the players' union and the league, so there
is essentially no precedent that can exist to guide the agreement. 63 The
process is too unique, which is an example of why the issue of the "one
and done" rule has not already been decided upon by a third-party not a
part of the union or the league.' 4 Once the courts become involved in the
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Wong,supra note 51.
Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)).
Id.
See Collective BargainingAgreement, supra note 2.
Brittany L. Forgues, Collective BargainingAgreements and What Has Changedin the NBA

and NFL, MSLAW BLOG (Apr. 2012), http://www.mslaw.edu/verdict-3/.

60. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 962 (noting that the contracted provisions in the CBA were "intimately related to 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment').
61. Id. at 961.
62. Id.
63. See id. ("Such bargaining relationships raise numerous problems with little or no precedent
....

.).

64. See generally id. ("The NBA/NBPA agreement is just such a unique bundle of compromises.").
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process, one would anticipate there would be less compromise and the
entire process would become much less organized and methodical.65
In 1954, Bob Cousy, a Boston Celtic, became the first President of
the National Basketball Players' Association (hereinafter "NBPA").6 6 At
this time, there were no regulations as to minimum wage, benefits, etc.67
However, "it was not until 1964 when the players threatened to strike for
the first televised NBA All-Star game, that the NBA recognized the
NBPA as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the players."68 Throughout the history of the NBA there have been multiple CBA
agreements between the NBA and the NBPA and each time a new CBA
is negotiated, there are issues between both sides.6 9 In order to settle these
disputes, the NBA and NBPA developed a system of dispute resolution,
similar to other sports leagues and their CBAs. There are two types of
arbitrators allowed by the CBA, one is a grievance arbitrator and the other
is a system arbitrator.7" The grievance arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction
over all disputes that may arise which involve any interpretation or compliance issues with any section of the CBA.71 Additionally, the grievance
arbitrator has this same influence over any player contract.72 The CBA
also sets forth the duties of a system arbitrator:
The NBA and the Players Association shall agree upon a System Arbitrator, who shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine any and all
disputes arising under Articles I, II, VII (except as otherwise specifically
provided by Article VII, Section 3(d)(5)), VIII, X; XI, XII, XIII, XIV,
XV, XVI, XXXVII, XXXIX, and XL of this Agreement, any and all
disputes arising under Article XXVIII and Paragraph 14 of the Uniform
Player Contract regarding an Unauthorized Sponsor Promotion (as that
term is defined in Paragraph, 14(c) of the Uniformn Player contract), and
those disputes made subject to his jurisdiction by Sections 9 and 10 of
this Article. In addition, in the event of a disagreement between the NBA

65. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 961 ("If courts were to intrude ... leagues and their player unions
would have to arrange their affairs in a less efficient way.").
66. Ryan T. Dryer, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective BargainingAgreements in
ProfessionalSports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. DiSP. RESOL. 267, 274 (2008).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 274-75.
69. See generallyid. at 275-76 (discussing the 1976,1980, 1983, and 1988 agreements between
the NBA and NBPA).
70. Id. at 278.
71. Id.; see 2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL Ass'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra
note 3, at 392.
72. 2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 3, at
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and the Players Association, the System Arbitrator shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether the System Arbitrator, the Grievance

Arbitrator or some other arbitrator provided for by the provisions of
73 this
Agreement has jurisdiction to hear or resolve a particular dispute.
Among the articles covered in the system arbitrator's designation is
the player eligibility and draft age.74
Currently, one of the biggest CBA issues between the NBA and the
NBPA is the drafting process into the league, in determining which players are eligible for the draft and which are not. 75 The court in Wood defined the NBA/NBPA agreement as "such a unique bundle of compromises.

76

THE "ONE

IV.

AND

DONE" RULE

Player eligibility in the NBA draft has been a hotly contested issue
within the professional basketball sphere for a fairly long time. In this
77
context, "a draft is a process used to allocate certain players to teams."
But what is the "one and done" rule and why was it implemented?
Since the NBA began gaining popularity in the 1970s, players were
78
able to declare for the NBA and enter the draft right from high school.
There have been many notable players who have declared for the NBA
draft such as LeBron James, Kobe Bryant, and Kevin Gamett, who had
successful careers. 79 Nevertheless, there were some players who came to
the NBA right out of high school and struggled.8 ° In the 2004 draft, eight
of the first nineteen picks in the draft were straight out of high school, and
this was when former commissioner David Stem began to push for an
updated rule.8" Originally, he wanted the players to be at least twenty
years old.8 2 But in 2005, the NBA and the NBPA came together and

73.

2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL Ass'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 3, at

410.
74. See id. (including Article X as part of the system arbitrator's purview).
75. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987).
76. Id.
77. Weston Jenson, RSL 101: What is the MLS DraftSystem? Understandingthe intricacies of
the league, SB NATION (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.rslsoapbox.com/2015/3/5/8144897/rsl-101what-is-the-mls-draft-system-understanding-the-intricacies-of.
78. Bontemps, supra note 1.
79. Id.
80. But see id. (listing a few very successful players who were drafted right out of high school).
81.

Id.

82. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol37/iss2/5

10

Magardician: Elimination of the NBA's "One and Done" Rule Will Open Doors for

20201

ELIMINATION OF THE NBA "S"ONE AND DONE" RULE

eventually settled for what is now called the "one and done" rule.83 The
"one and done" rule is:
The player (A) is or will be at least nineteen (19) years of age during the
calendar year in which the Draft is held, and (B) with respect to a player
who is not an international player (defined below), at least one (1) NBA
Season has elapsed since the player's graduation from high school (or,
if the player did not graduate from high school, since the graduation of
the class with which the player would have graduated had he graduated
from high school).84

Thus, a player must be at least nineteen years old, turning nineteen
in the year of the draft when they declare, or at least one year removed
from high school."
The "one and done" rule originally worked very well at the professional and collegiate levels.86 Collegiate basketball fans were now able to
see top tier high school basketball players compete at the collegiate level,
and the players coming into the NBA were more mature and well-rounded
players. 87 As a result, colleges heavily recruited players to their teams
who could go to school for at least one year to work on their craft.8 8 However, it soon became clear that the top tiered players would never stay in
school for more than the one year requirement because there was no incentive for the players to stay within their college program.8 9 Recruiters
for colleges now have the added pressure of attempting to recruit players
who won't just declare for the NBA draft after only one year. 90 A secondary major issue that arises from the "one and done" rule is whether

83. Bontemps, supranote 1.
84. See 2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL Ass'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note
3, at 273.
85. Id.
86. Myron Medcalf, Roots of one-and-done rule run deep, ESPN (June 26, 2012), https://
4
www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/8097 1/roots-nba-draft-one-done-rule-rundeep-men-college-basketball.
87. Id.
88. See Kevin O'Connor, High School Angst: What Abolishing the One-and-DoneRule Would
Mean for the NBA, THE RINGER (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.theringer.com/nba/2019/2/25
/18239529/nba-one-and-done-draft-zion-williamson.
89. See Allen Barra, Both the NBA and the NCAA Want to Keep Athletes in Collegefor Too
2
Long, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 6, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/201 /04
25553
5/.
/both-the-nba-and-the-ncaa-want-to-keep-athletes-in-college-for-too-long/
90. Id.
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student-athletes should be compensated for their time playing collegiate
1
sports.

V.

9

THE NCAA

It has been found again and again, that student-athletes do not have
the right to receive compensation for their time spent playing, other than
in the form of a scholarship.92 The formation of the NCAA provided guidance on the rules for collegiate sports, 93 and it has a very rich history as to
how it was formed.
Collegiate sports have been around for nearly 150 years. 94 There has
been a consistency among a variety of sources that the first inter-collegiate
game, which was football, took place on November 6, 1869, between Rutgers and Princeton. 95 At that time, "college football was a [very] rough
game." 96 Players were frequently injured, and it was not outlandish for
players to be killed in the midst of a game. 97 Additionally, schools were
allowed to hire out of network students or acquire players from other
schools to play.9" Finally in 1905, in order to bring all the problems of
college football injuries to a halt, President Theodore Roosevelt called a
meeting in an attempt to come to a solution. 99 As a result, the presidents
of 62 colleges or universities came together to establish a uniform system
of rules for college football.'
They founded the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association, which would serve as the organization that would monitor
the schools and ensure that they were abiding by the rules. 1 ' In 1910, the
Intercollegiate Athletic Association officially changed its name to the National Collegiate Athletic Association.10 2

91. See Madisen Martinez, Should College Student-Athletes Be Paid?Both Sides of the Debate,
COLLEGEXPRESS (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.collegexpress.com/articles-and-advice/athletics/blog
/should-college-student-athletes-be-paid-both-sides-debate/ (discussing both sides of the argument as
of whether student athletes should be paid for their time).
92. Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 293 (7th Cir. 2016); O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049,
1054 (9th Cir. 2015).
93. See O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1053.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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The NCAA has grown to include approximately 1,100 schools,
which are organized into three divisions: Division I, Division II, and Division 1. 103 The division with the most substantial athletic programs is
Division 1L To be in the Division I category, "schools must sponsor at
least fourteen varsity sports teams ... and they provide the most financial
10 5 Today, the Division I category has about 350
aid to student-athletes."
106
schools.
member
The NCAA has created many rules, one of which does not allow for
student-athletes to be paid for their services to the school. 1 7 The main
reason for this ordinance is that students are considered amateurs of the
sports and therefore are not entitled to a form of payment.'0 8
In the beginning, the NCAA established this rule in order to curb the
growing hostility that hiring players entailed. 10 9 , However, since the
NCAA was still technically a voluntary organization, no one heeded the
guidelines put in place." 0 In 1948, the NCAA adopted the "Sanity Code,"
which is "a set of rules that prohibited schools from giving athletes financial aid that was based on athletic ability and not available to ordinary
students."'' This was later changed in 1956 to allow for schools to grant
scholarships based on athletic ability.'1 2 Also included in the 1948 edition
of the "Sanity Code," was a rule, which created a compliance mechanism
to enforce their rules." 3 The compliance mechanism created "a Compliance Committee that could terminate an institution's NCAA membership."1 4
As previously mentioned, in 1956, the NCAA allowed its members
student-athletes scholarships, which were capped at "a full 'grant
grant
to
in aid. '1115 The "grant in aid" is considered for payment of "tuition and
fees, room and board, and required course-related books."'1 16 Interestingly, student-athletes could not receive any financial aid based on athletic
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1053.
Id.
Id.

111.
112.
113.

Id
Id.
Id.

Id.
Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 293 (7th Cir. 2016).
See O'Bannon,802 F.3d at 1054.

Id.
Id

114. Id.(citing Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender ofAmateurism
or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 333 (2007)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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ability that amounted to more than the already capped scholarship
amount. 1 7 If they were granted more money than designated by the
NCAA, they may lose their eligibility to participate in collegiate athletics.118 Student-athletes were allowed to "seek additional financial aid not
related to their athletic skills; if they chose to do this, the total amount of
athletic and nonathletic financial aid [not related to their athletic skill]...
could not exceed the 'cost of attendance' at their respective schools.""' 9
In 2014, based on the NCAA's approval, the member schools were allowed to increase scholarships for student-athletes so that the scholarship
would encompass the full cost of attendance.l 0 Its eighty member schools
voted to take that step in January of 2015 and the scholarship cap is now
at the full cost of attendance for those schools. 21 The NCAA is very adamant in ensuring the amateurism of its students.
The NCAA has indicated their encouragement of the inhibition of
student-athletes' compensation rights through the amateurism rules they
have accepted. 122 There are two common, notable examples of this policy:
(1) a student "athlete can lose his amateur status, for example, if he signs
a contract with a professional team, enters a professional league's player
draft, or hires an agent;' 2' and (2) student-athletes cannot receive any pay
(with a few exceptions) based on their athletic ability. 124 Under those exceptions, student-athletes cannot participate in booster programs, companies seeking to endorse the player, or licenses using the player's name,
125
image, and likeness.
VI.

LANDMARK CASES EFFECTING STUDENT-ATHLETE'S
RIGHTS

There are two major cases that have paved the way for an analysis of
student-athletes rights: Berger v. National CollegiateAthletic Association

117.
118.

See O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054.
Id.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 1054-55.
121.

Id. at 1055 (citing Marc Tracy, Top Conferences to Allow Aidfor Athletes 'Full Bills, N.Y.

TIMEs (Jan. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/sports/ncaas-top-conferences-to-allowaid-for-athletes-full-bills.html).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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(hereinafter "Berger") and O 'Bannon v. National CollegiateAthletic As126
sociation (hereinafter "O 'Bannon").
A. Berger v. National CollegiateAthletic Association
Berger is an ideal case to read when attempting to understand the
topic of student-athlete compensation. 127 The district court dismissed the
plaintiff's suit against all of the defendants for lack of standing. 128 The
129
appellate court then reviewed the decision de novo.
Student-athletes sued their college, the NCAA, and more than 120
other Division I schools within the NCAA's jurisdiction.1 30 The two
plaintiffs in the case were Gillian Berger and Taylor Henning.131 Berger
and Henning were both former students at the University of Pennsylvania
(hereinafter "Penn"), and both students participated in Penn's women's
132
track and field team.
Penn's track and field team was, and still is, regulated by the NCAA
(as are most other collegiate sport participating schools).13 3 Penn's track
team competes in the Division I category, which as discussed above, is
the division that consists of the biggest colleges and universities in the
country. 13' The students argued that student-athletes could be considered
"employees" under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1934 (hereinafter
"FLSA").' 35 The students contended that by not paying students, the
schools violated the Act, and the court rejected this argument in a twostep process.1 36 The first step was to establish that student-athletes are
considered amateurs and the sports they play are "extra-curricular activities.' 3 7 Once established, the court went on to say that because the student athletes can be considered amateurs, then the FLSA cannot be applied. 138

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285,289 (7th Cir. 2016); O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
Berger, 843 F.3d at 289.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 290.
Id. at 292.
Id. at292-93.
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In analyzing whether students should be considered amateurs, the
court began by analyzing the FLSA "alleged employees rule."13 9 Pursuant
to the FLSA, injuries to the alleged employees can only be redressed and
traceable to the employer. 4 Additionally, the FLSA requires every employer to pay their employees a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.141 The
plaintiffs in the case compared student-athletes to interns and attempted
to persuade the court to use this standard.'4 2 The plaintiffs wanted the
court to apply a multifactor test in order to make their determination, but
the court declined because the plaintiffs did not take into account the tradition of amateurism or the harsh reality of the student-athlete experi43
ence. 1
The Supreme Court stated that college sports have been revered to
be an amateur competition. 144 To further this idea, the NCAA has created
a system of elaborate rules that define eligibility for student-athletes to
receive compensation. 45 The plaintiffs also tried to argue that NCAA
athletes are comparable to work-study participants and therefore should
be considered employees under the FLSA. 146 However, the court stated
that interscholastic activities, such as collegiate sports, are not included in
the FLSA's definition of an employee.1 47 The court even went on to cite
a law review article, which collected a multitude of cases and concluded
that "the courts have been consistent finding that student athletes are not
recognized as employees under any legal standard, whether bringing
14 8
claims under workers' compensation laws, the NLRA or FLSA.',
After establishing that student-athletes are considered amateurs, the
court then needed to decide whether or not the students were employees
of the schools, and if so, they deserved to be paid. 149 Initially, the court
looked to how the FLSA defines an "employee.""15 The FLSA defines
the term "employee" in a rather circular fashion:

139. Berger, 843 F.3d at 290.
140. Id. at 289 (citing Roman v. Guapos III, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 407, 412 (D. Md. 2013)).
141. Id. at 290.
142. Id.
143. Id. at290-91.
144. Id. at 291 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)).
145. Id. (citing O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015)).
146. Id. at 293.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 292 (citing Adam Epstein & Paul M. Anderson, The Relationship Between a Collegiate Student-Athlete and the University: An Historicaland Legal Perspective, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REv. 287, 297 (2016)).
149. Id. at 289.
150. See generally id. at 290 (examining the FLSA definition of an "employee").
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Section 203(e)(1) defines "employee" in an unhelpful and circular fashion as "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. §
203(e)(1). Section 203(g) broadly defines "employ" as "to suffer or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). Thus, to qualify as an employee for
purposes of the FLSA, one must 151
perform "work" for an "employer."
"Work" is not defined by the Act.
The court ultimately held that students should not be considered employees because of the amateur nature of the sports that they play.152
This decision, which has been upheld, has greatly changed the landscape of collegiate sports, in conjunction with the drafting rules of all professional sports organizations; the NBA in particular.15 3 Now, players
who may be ready for the NBA draft are forced to lose out on at least one
year of earnings. "' This decision between the NBA and NBPA had hon-

orable intentions when first established, but it has not worked.
B. O'Bannon v. National CollegiateAthletic Association
Another case that has changed the track of collegiate sports is O 'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.15 5 O'Bannon addressed
whether the NCAA's rules prohibiting student-athletes from receiving
compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses (hereinafter "NIL's") are subject to antitrust laws, and if so, whether they unlawfully restrain trade.156 The main issue in O'Bannon's complaint was that
the NCAA's amateurism rules, and how they allow the use of students'
NIL's without compensation to the students, are a violation of Sherman
One.157 Ed O'Bannon is a former basketball player at UCLA who, in
2008, discovered that his likeness was being used by Electronic Arts
(hereinafter "EA") in one of their college men's football and basketball
video games. 158 The video game featured players from the late 1990s until
approximately 2013.159 The avatar that EA created looked like O'Bannon
and wore his jersey, which included his former number. 6 ° "O'Bannon
151. Berger, 843 F.3d at 290.
152. Id. at 293.
153.

154.
155.
NCAA's
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL Ass'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 3.

Id.
See generally O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (examining whether the
rules are subject to the Sherman Act).
Id. at 1052.
Id.
Id. at 1055.
Id.
Id.
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had never consented to the use of his likeness in the video game, and he
had not been compensated for it."'' In 2009, O'Bannon filed suit against
62
the NCAA and the Collegiate Licensing Company (hereinafter "CLC"). 1
The CLC is the entity that oversees the licensing of the trademarks in federal court of the NCAA and a few of its member schools for commercial
use. 163 At approximately the same time, Sam Keller, a former collegiate
quarterback, brought suit against the NCAA, CLC, and EA for a similar
reason as O'Bannon. 1 64 The cases were consolidated during the pretrial
proceedings.165
The O'Bannon antitrust issue against the NCAA was brought to a
bench trial in the district court in June 2014, after the plaintiffs had settled
166
their claims against EA and CLC, which the district court approved.
The district court held that the NCAA's compensation rules were unlawfully restraining trade. 167 It then so ordered the NCAA to bestow a full
grant of scholarships to their student-athletes, which would provide for
the full cost of attendance to their school, and $5,000 to be held in trust
for their athletes until after they leave college.1 68 The appellate court affinned in part and reversed in part. 169 The district court reasoned with an
in depth and detailed analysis, beginning with "identifying the markets in
which the NCAA allegedly restrained trade.""17 The two markets being
affected were the college education market and the group licensing mar171
ket.
The court first found that a college education market exists and consists of FBS football schools (Division I membership for football is divided into two subdivisions: Football Bowl Subdivision (hereinafter
"FBS") and the Football Championship Subdivision (hereinafter
"FCS")) 172 and Division I basketball schools. 173 These schools recruit the
nation's best high school players. 174 They did so by offering services such
as scholarships, access to coaching, access to athletic facilities, and the
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1052-53.
Id. at 1053.
Id.
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1056-57.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1056.
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opportunity to compete at the highest collegiate athletic level.175 There
are very few athletes who are talented enough to play basketball on the
Division I level or FBS football, and of those few, a very small percentage
of those athletes will opt not to attend school or play for a lower level
division.176 Additionally, for those two sports, as mentioned in the court's
opinion, one cannot enter the NBA or NFL from high school.177 Therefore, the court held that FBS football and Division I basketball are not
liable under Sherman One because "there are no professional [or college]
football or basketball leagues capable of supplying a substitute for the
services that FBS football and Division I basketball
bundle of goods and
17 8
schools provide."
The court then found that the group licensing market exists.179 If not,
"for the NCAA's compensation rules, college football and basketball athletes would be able to sell group licenses for the use of their NILs. 18 ° The
court broke down the "groups" into three subcategories: "(1) live game
telecasts, (2) sports video games, and (3) game rebroadcasts, advertisements, and other archival footage" of those games. 181 The court then addressed each category individually.1 82 When discussing the transmission
of live games "the court noted that the TV networks that broadcast live
college football and basketball games 'often seek to acquire the rights to
use' the players' NILs." 183 This, the court stated, "'demonstrates that
there is a demand for these rights' on the networks' part." 184 For video
games, the lower court concluded "that the use of NILs increased the attractiveness of college sports video games to consumers, creating a demand for players' NILs."185 Therefore, there is an increased demand for
the use of the players' NILs.1 86 Finally, the court turned to the archival
footage category, and the district court noted that the NCAA had permitted a company called "T3Media" to the use footage of past and current

175.

O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
id.
Id.

181.
182.

Id.
Id.

183. Id. (quoting O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
184. Id. (quoting O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
185.

Id.

186. Id.
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college athletes. 18 7 This also proves that there is a strong appeal to have
188
this footage.
The district court applied this analysis when it ruled that the NCAA's
implementation of its compensation rules have "potentially restrained
competition in these two markets. 1 89 More specifically, the NCAA's amateurism guidelines inhibit competition "in the college education market
but not in the group licensing market." 9 ' However, it then concluded that
the rules actually serve procompetitive purposes.19 1 Nevertheless, the
court felt there could be a less restrictive alternative that could exist that
still serves the same procompetitive purpose of the current rules. 19 2 Therefore, the current rules that were in place were unlawful. 193 The court came
to these conclusions through the "Rule of Reason" test.194
The "Rule of Reason," which long outdates the Sherman Act, has
served as a filter on the exact language of the Sherman Act.'9 5 Absent the
"Rule of Reason," the Sherman Act cannot retain the meaning it was purported to convey. 196 As briefly mentioned earlier, the Sherman Act basically states that every contract that puts a restraint on trade is unlawful,
which the court in National Society of Professional Engineers states
would then completely out rule the entire existence of private contract
law. 19 7 The court stated that Congress "makes it perfectly clear that it
expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition" and thus the "Rule of Reason" test has
198
served to shape the Sherman Act.
What the "Rule of Reason" essentially states is whether the chal99
lenged acts, "were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions."'
Under this test, unreasonableness could be based on either: "(1) on the
nature or character of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances
giving rise to the inference or presumption that they were intended to

187. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Nat'l Soc'y ofProfl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
196. Id. (explaining that the Sherman Act essentially eliminates any suppression of trade, which
would in turn undermine private contract law).
197. Id. at 687-88.
198. Id. at 688.
199. Id. at 690.
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restrain trade and enhance prices."20 0 The true test required by the "Rule
of Reason" is whether the agreement that is being questioned either encourages competition or inhibits it. 20 1 A "Rule of Reason" analysis has
three steps: (1) the plaintiff must show that the restraint in place actually
inhibits competitive effects instead of promoting them within the applicable market; (2) once the plaintiff has done this, the defendant must prove
that the restraint in place actually promotes competition; and (3) it is the
plaintiff responsibility to show that any of the actual objectives offered by
the restraint can be accomplished in a "substantially less restrictive manner."2 02
1. Anticompetitive Effects
The court found that the NCAA's rules have an anticompetitive effect on the entire college education market.20 3 If these rules did not exist,
then colleges would compete to recruit the top players with compensation
2°
that would exceed the cost of attendance at their respective schools.
This would essentially lower the price that student-athletes would have to
pay for both athletic and educational opportunities that the school provides.2 5 Therefore, the rule that restricts the compensation of student6 Studentathletes for use of their NIL's is a price fixing agreement.20
athletes pay for services provided by colleges through their labor, and the
20 7 In this
colleges as the sellers, agree to value the students NIL's at zero.
situation, the colleges are effectively a cartel. 2 8 The collective colleges
and universities are a group of sellers who colluded to price fix their product.

2 09

200. Nat'l Soc'y of ProflEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 690.
201. /d.at691.
202. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S.
Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[1] The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that
the restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant market. [2] If the plaintiff
meets this burden, the defendant must come forward with evidence of the restraint's procompetitive
effects. [3] The plaintiff must then show that any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.")).
203. Id. at 1057.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1057-58.
207. Id. at 1058.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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The district court also generated an alternative theory in which the
students are the sellers and the schools are one collective buyer. 2 10 In this
alternate perspective, the college education market can be considered a
monopsony, which is "a market in which there is only one buyer for a
particular good or service. 2 1' By the collective buyers (colleges and universities) agreement to not pay anything to the sellers (the student-athletes) for their NILs, they are in turn causing a harm in competition.212
Conversely, the court did find "that the NCAA's rules do not have
an anticompetitive effect on any of the submarkets of the group licensing
market," such as "(1) live game telecasts, (2) sports video games, and (3)
game rebroadcasts, advertisements, and other archival footage" of those
games.21 3 If the NCAA rules were eliminated, there would be no contention between any of submarkets. 2 4 The court's reasoning was:
That the value of an NIL license to a live game broadcaster or a video
game company would depend on the licensee's acquiring every other
NIL license that was available.... Similarly, a video game producer
would want to
acquire NIL rights for all of the teams it needed to include
215
in the game.
In that case, the multitude of student-athlete groups that exist would
not feel the need to compete so they could sell their NIL. 2 16 The anticipated effect projected is that the student-athletes would have an interest to
cooperate to make sure their NIL selling power would be as complete as
possible. 2 7 Regarding the "archival footage, '218 the court found that the
NCAA's alignment with "T3Media" did not strip the student-athletes ability to collect any compensation they could receive because "T3Media"
cannot sell footage of present-day student-athletes. 219 Additionally, they
must acquire the approval of the former athlete who may appear in the
film in any way before using their NIL.22 °
On the appellate level, the NCAA offered three arguments, stating
that the district court erred in its finding that "the compensation rules do
210. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1058.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213.

Id.

214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id.
Id.

217.

Id.

218.

Id.

219.

Id.

220.

Id.
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not have significant anticompetitive effects. ' 221 The Court of Appeals ultimately denied all three arguments and affirmed the district court's finding that, "the compensation rules have a significant anticompetitive ef2 22
fect.
2. Pro-competitive Purposes
The NCAA offered several arguments as to why the rules currently
in place were lawful and how prohibiting student's from receiving compensation actually promotes competition instead of inhibiting it. 223 The
four arguments the NCAA offered were: "(1) preserving 'amateurism' in
college sports; (2) promoting competitive balance in FBS football and Division I basketball; (3) integrating academics and athletics; and (4) increasing output in the college market. ' 224 The district court accepted the
first and third arguments, and rejected the second and fourth.225 On appeal, the court upheld the district court's findings.2 26
a.

Preserving Amateurism

The NCAA first attempted to argue that the restrictions on studentathlete compensation are imperative in preserving the amateur tradition in
college sports and the identity that college sports maintain. 22 ' The NCAA
also argued that the amateurism aspect is one of the core principles that
exists within its organization and is a main factor in the popularity of college sports among consumers and fans. 228 The court did not agree. 229 The
court stated that the NCAA's definition of amateurism is "malleable" and
is constantly changing over time in notable and contrasting ways.2 3 °
221.

O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070.

222.

Id. at 1070-72; see also Antitrust Labor Law Issues In Sports, USLEGAL, https://

sportslaw.uslegal.com/antitrust-and-labor-law-issues-in-sports/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2020) ("Amateur sports in America do not have nearly as many legal challenges involving antitrust laws. Courts
seem to have afforded amateur athletic organizations more latitude and less scrutiny. Several cases
involving antitrust analysis in the amateur sports context have offered some guidance and certainty
as to how antitrust laws should apply in the amateur sports context. For example, in NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Okia., 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the NCAA's television broadcast plan was held to be
anti-competitive and in violation of the Sherman Act.").
223. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1058.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1072.
227. Id. at 1058.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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Therefore, the court concluded that "amateurism" is not a main convention for the NCAA. 2 31 Additionally, the district court was not persuaded
that amateurism is the primary driver of consumer and fan interest in college sports; however, the court did find that amateurism does serve procompetitive purposes.2 32 The court ultimately held that the NCAA's understanding of amateurism does play a certain role in the popularity of
NCAA sports. 233 "It found that the NCAA's current rules serve a procomwhich in
petitive benefit by promoting this understanding of amateurism,
23 4
turn helps preserve consumer demand for college sports.,
b. Procompetitive Balance
Next, the NCAA argued that limiting compensation to student-athletes helps create an equal playing field between FBS and Division I
schools in the recruiting process, and in this way, the competitive balance
among these schools' teams is being preserved. 5 The district court found
that these rules do not promote a competitive balance. 23 6 The court explained that numerous economists have studied the NCAA and its compensation rules, and nearly all of these economists have concluded that
the compensation rules do not promote a competitive balance.2 37 In addition, the court noted that the NCAA does not allow its member schools to
pay student athletes beyond a fixed scholarship. 238 The schools may invest money into other aspects of the athletic program, such as coaching
and their facilities.239 These other aspects that schools can invest in essentially "negate[] whatever equalizing effect the NCAA's" compensation restraint had.24 ° Therefore, "[t]he court concluded that competitive
balance was thus 1not a viable justification for restricting student-athlete
24
compensation.,

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

O'Bannon, 802 F.3dat 1059.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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c.

Integrating Academics and Athletics

After the district court denied the NCAA's argument for procompetitive balance, the NCAA then put forth the argument that their restraints
on student-athlete compensation help integrate academics and athletics.24 2
More specifically, the NCAA asserted that the restraints would "improve
the quality of educational services provided to student-athletes. 2 43 According to the NCAA, the student-athletes Would be able to derive long
term benefits by student-athletes fully participating in academic life at
their respective schools and the current compensation rules in place would
promote this idea. 2"
The district court held that "this was a viable procompetitive justification for the NCAA's regulating the college education market, but it concluded that most of the benefits of academic and athletic 'integration' are
not the result of the NCAA's rules restricting compensation. '24 5 In its
place, this "integration" comes from other NCAA rules. 24 6 These rules
consist of: requiring student-athletes to attend class, disallowing athlete
only dormitories, and forbidding practice for more than a certain amount
of hours per week.24 7 In the court's opinion, the only way the NCAA's
argument that the compensation rules help the integration of academics
and athletics is "by prohibiting student-athletes from being paid large
sums of money not available to ordinary stiidents, the rules prevent the
creation of a social 'wedge' between student-athletes and the rest of the
student body., 248 Despite the existence of a "social wedge," it is avoided
and can be considered an actual procompetitive goal.24 9 This alone does
not justify a complete ban on paying student-athletes and the use of their
250
NILs.
d. Increasing Output
The last argument that the NCAA put before the court in regards to
lack of compensation for the use of students' NILs was that these

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059.
Id. (quoting O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp, 3d 955, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
Id.
Id. at 1059-60.
Id. at 1060.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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restraints increase output in the college education market.2 1 This is due
to increasing the opportunities for students to play FBS football or Division I basketball. 2 According to the NCAA, this is accomplished by attracting schools who have a "philosophical commitment to amateurism"
that can compete in Division
concept, and through this, there are schools
253
I that could not otherwise afford to do so.
The district court rejected this entire argument.254 The court was of
the opinion that schools do not join Division I because of the "philosophical commitment to amateurism. ' ' 255 The court acknowledged that there
have been some major schools that had "lobbied to change the NCAA's
scholarship rules to raise compensation limits. 256 The court went on to
explain that schools not in the Division I category still must abide by the
same "amateurism rules as Division I schools. 2 57 This in turn makes it
highly doubtful that schools become a member of the Division I category
because of the "amateurism rules." '5 8 The argument is futile still, because
the court also found no support for the assertion that the NCAA's compensation rules enable more schools to compete in the Division I category. 259 Division I schools do not share in revenue, so there is no reason
to believe that cost savings from not providing compensation to studentathletes are being used to fund additional scholarships at low revenue
schools.26 ° There is also no reason to believe that saving costs would
make it easier for those schools to become a part of the Division I cate26 1

gory.

On appeal, the court concluded that "the NCAA's compensation
rules serve the two procompetitive purposes identified by the district
court. '26 2 Since both courts found that two of the arguments presented by
the NCAA were found to be procompetitive, the courts then addressed the
2 63
final step of the "Rule of Reason" test.

251.
252.
253.
254.

O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1060.
Id.
Id.
Id.

255.

Id.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1074.
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C. Less Restrictive Alternatives
When conducting an analysis on the less restrictive alternatives, the
court considered if there were other means available "than a total ban on
compensating student athletes for use of their NILs.- 26 4 The plaintiffs had
recognized two actual, less restrictive alternatives to the current rules that
the NCAA put in place. 26 5 The alternatives were: (1) allowing colleges
and universities to grant student-athletes a financial award that would
cover "the full cost of attendance," which would make up for any lack in
their grants; and (2) permitting schools to hold a portion of the licensing
revenue in a trust, which would be distributed to the student-athletes after
they leave college.266 The court accepted both of these alternatives and
held that neither of these alternatives would sabotage the "procompetitive" goal that the NCAA is trying to achieve.26 7
The Court of Appeals held that: (1) the district court did not clearly
err in allowing NCAA member schools to give student-athletes a full grant
of scholarship; but (2) the district court did err "when it found that allowis virtually as effecing students to be paid compensation for their NIL's
268
tive as the NCAA's current amateur-status rule.,
The totality of the evidence that was presented to the district court
suggested that raising the overall scholarship amount to include to the full
cost of attendance would have almost no impact on the NCAA's amateur
rules. 269 The money received from a full grant of scholarship would be
going to cover the student-athletes costs of attendance. 270 From the evidence presented, there was no indication that if student-athletes were to
receive full scholarships, then consumers of college sports would be less
interested, or that this would interfere with the integration of student-athletes into their academic communities.2 71 Thus, the increase has no effect
on the procompetitive purposes of the NCAA, and the increase in scholarship is a substantially less restrictive alternative under the "Rule of Rea272
son" test.
The Court of Appeals held that the district court "clearly erred" in
finding that it is a practical alternative to allow students to receive
264.

O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1060.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1074-75.

270.

Id. at 1075.

271.
272.

Id.
Id.
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compensation for use of their NILs. 2 73 The court did not agree that this
rule to pay student-athletes money for use of their NILs along with a rule
that forbids them from receiving cash for use of their NILs are equally
effective in the promotion of amateurism and preserving demand among
consumers. 274 In finding this, the district court ignored the fact that what
makes student-athletes amateurs is their lack of payment. 2 75 Amateurism
is an integral part of the NCAA's market and being a "poorly-paid" athlete
is not the same thing as falling within the amateur category.276 It is a
substantial increase from allowing student-athletes to have the resources
to pay educational expenses to offering them a sum of money.27 7 At that
point, the NCAA would have completely abandoned its amateurism values and would effectively become a minor league enterprise.27 8
The Court of Appeals completely abolished any student-athlete's
hope to receive compensation for use of their NILs in any market. Hence,
the NCAA basketball players will not be able to receive non-educational
compensation for their services until they declare for the NBA draft. But
this can only occur after one year of college basketball has been played,
so these players are losing a year's worth of salary.
Berger and O'Bannon have made it abundantly clear that the
NCAA's amateurism rules are ones that must be upheld, as they establish
standards setting forth the rules and regulations to apply to future amateurs.27 9 Since these rules are considered to be procompetitive and since
the student-athletes cannot be considered employees of those schools,
they will not receive payment.2 8 ° The law is extremely clear and because
of this, these student-athletes' right to compensation is being infinged
upon while under the presumption that they are good enough to enter the
NBA draft from the high school level. The NBA has set salaries in place
for the incoming rookies and this money is guaranteed to those drafted.28 1

273. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. ("[T]he district court cannot plausibly conclude that being a poorly-paid professional
collegiate athlete is 'virtually as effective' for that market as being as amateur.").
277. Id. at 1078.
278. Id. at 1079.
279. Id. at 1070; Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016) ("To maintain this tradition of
amateurism,... [there is] an elaborate system of eligibility rules... these rules 'define what it means
to be an amateur or a student-athlete, and are therefore essential to the very existence of collegiate
athletics.").
280. O'Bannon, 802 F.3dat 1079.
281. See 2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note
3, at Exhibit B-2.
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VII.

THE ROOKIE SALARY SCALE

The NBA has a different set of scales in order to determine the rookie
282
salary cap compared to paying other players outside of their rookie year.
The scale is based on the number pick the players were in the NBA draft
they had declared for.283 The following few paragraphs will explore the
salary options and guarantees that the first five picks in the NBA draft will
receive over a five-year period.284
A. Pick One
Pick one is guaranteed a first year salary of $5,091,500.285 This is
along with a second year salary of $5,346,100.286 For the third year there
is an option salary of $5,600,700.287 Then, for the fourth year, there is a
guarantee of at least a 26.1 percent increase over the previous year's salary. 288 Lastly, if the number one overall pick is granted a qualifying offer
in their now fourth year in the NBA, they are guaranteed a 30 percent
increase in salary from the previous year.289
B. Pick Two
Pick two is guaranteed $4,555,500 in the first year that they play in
the NBA. 29° The second year salary is $4,783,300.291 For the third year,
there is an option salary of $5,011,100.292 Then for the fourth year, there
is a guarantee of at least a 26.2 percent increase over the previous year's
salary.29 3 Lastly, if the number two overall pick is granted a qualifying
offer in their fourth year in the NBA, they are guaranteed a 30.5 percent
increase in salary from the previous year. 294 This number has increased
because the number two pick has a slightly lower overall salary than the
282.

See generally 2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,

supra note 3, at Exhibit B-2 (setting forth the baseline rookie scale for the NBA).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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number one overall pick.295 Therefore, they have a higher opportunity to
gain more money.29 6
C. Pick Three
Pick three is guaranteed $4,090,900 in the first year that they play in
the NBA.2 97 The second year salary is $4,295,400.98 For the third year
there is an option salary of $4,500,000.299 Then for the fourth year, there
is a guarantee of at least a 26.4 percent increase over the previous year's
salary.30 0 Lastly, if the number three overall pick is granted a qualifying
offer in their fourth year in the NBA, they are guaranteed a 31.2 percent
increase in salary from the previous year.30 1
D. Pick Four
Pick four is guaranteed $3,688,400 in the first year that they play in
the NBA.30 2 The second year salary is $3,872,800.3o3 For the third year
there is an option salary of $4,057,200. 304 Then for the fourth year, there
is a guarantee of at least a 26.5 percent increase over the previous year's
salary.30 5 Lastly, if the number four overall pick is granted a qualifying
offer in their fourth year in the NBA, they are guaranteed a 31.9 percent
30 6
increase in salary from the previous year.
E. Pick Five
Pick five is guaranteed $3,340,000 in the first year that they play in
the NBA.30 7 The second year salary is $3,507,000.308 For the third year

295. See supra Section VII(A) (detailing the salary for a number one pick ranging between
$5,091,500 - $5,600,700 in the first three years).
296.

See 2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note

3, at Exhibit B-2.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300.

Id.

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

307.
308.

Id.
Id.
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there is an option salary of $3,674,000.309 Then, for the fourth year, there
is a guarantee of at least a 26.7 percent increase over the previous year's
salary.31 ° Lastly, if the number five overall pick is granted a qualifying
offer in their fourth year in the NBA, they are guaranteed a 32.6 percent
3 11
increase in salary from the previous year.
This information has been provided in a graph taken directly from
the NBA's CBA.3 12 If a player is ready to declare for the NBA draft and
has the ability to be selected within the top five picks, they have the potential of making at least 3.3 million dollars in their first year.313 Even if
a player is not drafted in the top five picks, the absolute minimum amount
of money that they could be earning within the first year of playing is
$815,615.3l4 That amount of money is definitely more than the full cost
of attendance for one year of any Division I school.315 To be clear, this
money is guaranteed regardless of playing time, injuries, etc.3 16
VIII.

OTHER LEAGUES' PLAYER ELIGIBILITY FOR THEIR
RESPECTIVE DRAFT

The other major sports leagues in the United States (National Football League (hereinafter "NFL"), National Hockey League (hereinafter
"NHL"), Major League Baseball (hereinafter "MLB"), and Major League
Soccer (hereinafter "MLS")) have their own draft process that is different

309.

See 2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note

3, at Exhibit B-2.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at Exhibit C.
315. Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016); O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053
(9th Cir. 2015); John R. Thelin, Here's Why We Shouldn't Pay College Athletes, MONEY (Mar. 1,
2016), http://money.com/money/4241077/why-we-shouldnt-pay-college-athletes/ ( "[A] 'grant-inaid' at an NCAA Division I university is about $65,000 if you enroll at a college with high
tuition. This includes such private colleges as Stanford, Duke, Northwestern, University
of Southern California, Syracuse, and Vanderbilt. The scholarship is $45,000 for tuition
and $20,000 for room, board and books. At state universities, the scholarship would be
lower if you were an 'in state' student - because tuition would be about $13,000. But if
Michigan coach Jim Harbaugh recruits nationwide and wants a high school player from
California or Texas, the University of Michigan out-of-state tuition bumps up to about the
same as that charged by the private colleges.").
316. See 2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note

3, at Exhibit B-2.
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than the NBA.3 17 This section will discuss those processes in order to
show that there are other ways that leagues structure their draft.
A.

The NFL

The NFL draft takes place each Spring and is a three day process.31 8
For players to be eligible for the NFL draft, they must have been out of
high school for a minimum of three years' time. 319 Additionally, the players must have completed their college eligibility before the next year's
college football season begins.32 If a player has not used their college
eligibility or have graduated before their college eligibility has been run
through, they must obtain league approval in order to be draft eligible.321
Lastly, "[p]layers are draft-eligible only in the year after the end of their
'
college eligibility."322
B. The NHL
The NHL breaks down draft eligibility into players from North
America and players from the rest of the world.323 Players from North
America are allowed to declare for the draft if they turn eighteen years old
by September 15th of the year that they are declaring for the draft.324 They
also must be under twenty years old before December 3 1st of the year that
they are declaring for the draft.32 5 If a player goes undrafted, then they
are allowed to re-declare for the draft as long as they are under twenty
3 27
In the case
years old. 326 "Players can only enter the NHL Draft twice.
that a North American player goes undrafted by the time that they turn

317. Brian Sniatkowski, Which of the five major American sports leagues is your favorite, and
why?, QuoRA (June 16, 2017), https://www.quora.com/Which-of-the-five-major-American-sportsleagues-is-your-favorite-and-why.
318. The Rules of the Draft, NFL FOOTBALL OPERATIONS, https://operations.nfl.com/the-players/the-nfl-draftthe-rules-of-the-draft/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Jamie Fitzpatrick, How the NHL Draft Works: Rules and Regulations of the NHL Entry
Draft., LIVEABOUTDOTCOM, https://www.liveabout.com/how-the-nhl-draft-works-2779285 (last updated June 21, 2019).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326.

Kristyn Repke, NHL Draft 101: Rules and information, BLUE JACKET NEWS (June 29,

2013), https://www.nhl.com/bluejackets/news/nhl-draft- 101-rules-and-information/c-675546.
327. Id.
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twenty, then they are considered an unrestricted free agent.3 28 If a player
is not from North America, they must be "over the age of 20" to be permiffed to enter the NHIL draft.329 "All non-North
Americans must be
330
age."
of
regardless
signed,
being
drafted before
What's interesting about the NHiL though, is that once drafted, players are still allowed to play in college and within the NCAA. 3 3 1 The team
that drafted that player keeps possession of thai player until thirty days
after the player has left college.332
C. The MLB
To be eligible for the MLB draft, there is more of a clear cut policy
that players must meet when declaring. 33 3 First, players are allowed to
declare right from high school once they have graduated without attending
college or junior college.33 4 In this instance, "[j]unior college[] is a general term for two year colleges. There are many that are private and offer
special services for Special Education students (for example) and/or offer
special two-year degrees."3'35 If a player decides to attend college, they
must have finished either their junior or senior years, or they must be at
least the age of twenty-one. 36 Junior college players are also allowed to
declare for the draft and in this instance, it does not matter what year they
have completed.3 37
D. - The MLS
The MLS draft is a little different. 338 The MLS' draft is termed a
"SuperDraft" because it includes both players that played in college and

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Repke, supra note 326.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 323.
Id.
Repke, supra note 326.
Id.
See First-YearPlayerDraft, supra note 12.

334. Id; see generally Tom Stagliano, What are the differences between community colleges,
junior colleges, and universities?, QUORA (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-

differences-between-community-colleges-junior-colleges-and-universities (defining the differences
between junior colleges, community colleges, and universities).
335. See Stagliano, supra note 334.
336. See First-YearPlayerDraft, supra note 12.
337. Id.
338. See Jenson, supra note 77 (explaining the way that the MLS draft works and the processes
involved).
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players that can be drafted through "other mechanisms. '339 The term
"other mechanisms" means that players outside of college (including teenagers) can be: (1) invited to MLS recruitment camps; (2) they can be
signed by "Generation Adidas;" or (3) they can be nominated by an MLS
team.34 ° MLS recruitment camps consist of a multitude of college seniors
who have not been drafted yet, but play at Division I schools.3 41 "Generation Adidas," "essentially... is a minor league system;" players partici34 2
pate in the program in order to only focus on their soccer careers.
Lastly, players can be nominated by an MLS team, and if this happens,
they are eligible to be drafted regardless of age.343
IX.

THE NBA's "ONE AND
ELIINATED

DONE" RULE SHOULD BE

The "one and done" policy was implemented in 2005, and since then,
the policy has done more harm than good. 34 4 The NBA's CBA agreement
is the document that governs the overall actions of the professional sports
league.34 5 In general, the "one and done" rule states that a player cannot
be younger than nineteen years old, turning nineteen in the year of the
draft they are declaring for, or at least one year removed from high
school.346
Being an athlete may be extremely appealing to many people around
the world, and in many ways, a career in professional sports is truly a
blessing; but this career path comes with some burdens. An athlete's employment rights do not come without difficulties and they have very little
power to combat these difficulties. This is especially true in the NBA
with the implementation of the "one and done" policy. The "one and
done" policy has inhibited the rights of potential incoming rookies.
Student-athletes are not considered employees under the FLSA,
which results in their inability to receive compensation for the services

339. See Jenson, supra note 77.
340. Rick Paulas, MLS Draft Eligibility Requirements, SPoRTSREC (Nov. 27, 2010), https://
www.sportsrec.com/mls-draft-eligibility-requirements-7566014.html.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. See Bontemps, supra note 1.
345.

See generally 2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,

supra note 3 (setting forth the rules and regulations of the NBA).
346. Id. at 273.
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they provide to the universities that they play for.347 Additionally, because
of the amateurism rules that the NCAA has implemented, which are
revered and strictly practiced throughout college sports, student-athletes
may only be considered amateurs.3 48 Therefore, the use of student-athletes' NILs can be used by multitudes of entities including television networks, video game companies, colleges (for jersey sales), etc. and the student-athlete will not be able to receive any compensation.3 49 As a result
of these holdings, it was further held that student-athletes cannot be paid
more than a full grant of scholarship to the University they are attending.350 Through a "Rule of Reason" analysis, the NCAA cannot be subject
to any Sherman violations, which disallows colleges and universities to
compensate student-athletes outside of a full grant in scholarship.3 5 '
A new CBA was recently negotiated in 2017, but the next negotiation
is set to take place in 2022.352 After this date, the next CBA is set to expire
in 2024, but there is an opt-out option that either the NBA or NBPA can
take.353 Hopefully both sides agree that the "one and done" rule should
be eliminated and that a different procedure can take its place that makes
more sense for all parties involved. Student-athletes are losing a significant amount of money because they are forced to attend one year of college.3" 4 The numbers speak for themselves.3 55
X.

SOLUTION TO REPAIR THE NBA's "ONE AND DONE" RULE

In concept, the NBA's "one and done" rule makes sense and has
aimed to serve a specific purpose. But because of this rule, players are
forced to lose out on a year's worth of earnings, which is guaranteed to be
at least $815,615.356 The student-athletes who have enough skill to

347. Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 293 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Adam Epstein & Paul M.
Anderson, The RelationshipBetween a CollegiateStudent-Athlete and the University: An Historical
and Legal Perspective, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 287,297 (2016).
348. See generally O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing the
NCAA's amateurism rules).
349. See id. at 1055.
350. See id. at 1079.
351. Id.
352. See Michael McCann, Biggest Takeaways: The NBA's New CBA Deal, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.si.com/nba/2016/12/15/nba-cba-details-takeawaysadam-silver-michele-roberts.
353. See id.
354.

See generally 2017 NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,

supra note 3 (explaining NBA pay restrictions on student-athletes).
355. Id. at Exhibit B-2.
356. Id. at Exhibit C-1.
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declare for the NBA draft have almost no reason to stay within their collegiate program other than for their desire to finish their college education.
This rule is not fair for the student-athlete, and it is also not fair for the
collegiate basketball fan. There are many people who believe that collegiate basketball is much better than professional basketball.35 7 Essentially, the current rule in place is not convenient or beneficial to anyone
involved.
The NBA's competitors (the NFL, NHL, MLB, and MLS) have
drafting rules that involve either remaining in college for an adequate
amount of time or being drafted from high school.358 In the NBA's next
CBA, the NBA and the NBPA should come to an agreement that is similar
to the MLB's. In this instance, a player is either allowed to declare right
out of high school, or if they decide to attend college and become a student-athlete, then they must have completed either their junior or senior
years of school, or must be at least twenty-one years of age.359 If this rule
were to be implemented, it would allow the student-athletes more freedom
to choose their path. The players can either declare for the draft right out
of high school and potentially begin their rookie career, or if they decide
to attend college, they must stay there for at least three years.36 In those
three years, players would most likely be able to significantly develop
their skill and it would provide fans the opportunity to enjoy watching
their favorite athlete compete on the collegiate level. Schools would be
more likely to generate profit from that player due to creating more revenue from fans purchasing merchandise, which is one of the more logical
solutions that benefits the majority of the parties involved. Hopefully, the
"one and done" rule will reach an expiration.
Armand Magardician*
357. See Tim Crothers, The 50 Reasons Why College Basketball Is Better Than Pro Basketball:
Got the NBA Lockout Blues? Relax, and Let Us Count the Ways That the College Game Is Superior,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED:VAULT (Nov. 23, 1998), https://www.si.com/vault/I998/11/23/252391/the-50reason s-why-college-basketball-is-better-than-pro-basketball-got-the-nba-lockout-bues-reax-andlet-us-count-the-ways-that-the-college-game-is-superior (listing 50 reasons why college basketball is
better than professional basketball); see also 5 Reasons Why College BasketballIs Better Than AnythingElse, KICKZ.COM (Mar. 18, 2017), https://www.kickz.com/blog/2017/03/18/5-reasons-why-college-basketball-is-better-than-anything-else/ (discussing why college basketball is better than professional basketball).
358. See The Rules of the Draft, supra note 318, at 6; Fitzpatrick, supra note 323, at 5; Repke,
supra note 326; First-YearPlayerDraft, supra note 12.
359. See First-YearPlayerDraft, supra note 12; Stagliano, supra note 334.
360. See First-YearPlayerDraft, supra note 12; Stagliano, supra note 334.
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